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CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 314(1):
NUDENESS OR LEWDNESS?
In In re Smith,' the California Supreme Court recently held that the
California Penal Code prohibition of indecent exposure2 does not pro-
scribe nude sunbathing on an isolated public beach, since, without
more, it is not "lewd" conduct. The court's ruling clarified the criteria
for determining what conduct qualifies as indecent exposure by
requiring that the state must produce "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the actor not only meant to expose himself, but intended
by his conduct to direct public attention to his genitals for purposes of
sexual arousal, gratification or affront."3
Acts of sexual exhibitionism and public indecency probably long
predated any written laws making such conduct illegal. Freud ex-
plained sexual exhibitionism by the male as a product of a "castra-
tion complex."4  Such acts, he maintained, are attempts to empha-
size the integrity of the male genitals, and signify the male's "infan-
tile" satisfaction over the female's lack of a penis. Whether or not
one chooses to accept Freud's explanation for such conduct, a review
of the reported cases indicates that criminal indecent exposure is,
and has been, essentially a male phenomenon. 5
As the English common law took shape, sexual exhibitionism was
classified as criminal. 6 Open and gross lewdness and lascivious be-
1. 7 Cal. 3d 362, 497 P.2d 807, 102 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1972).
2. CAL. PEN. CODE § 314(1) (West 1970).
3. 7 Cal. 3d at 366, 497 P.2d at 810, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 338. The term
"genitals" or "private parts" denotes the external procreative organs. Pendell v. State,
158 Tex. Crim. 119, 120, 253 S.W.2d 426, 427 (1952); accord, State v. Dennison, 72
Wash. 2d 842, 846, 435 P.2d 526, 529 (1967); see Clark v. People, 224 IM. 554,
560-61, 79 N.E. 941, 943 (1906). A woman's breasts are not "private parts" within
the meaning of a statute prohibiting exposure of "private parts," since they are not
part of her genital organs. State v. Jones, 7 N.C. App. 166, 168-69, 171 S.E.2d 468,
469 (1970); accord, State v. Moore, 194 Ore. 232, 240-41, 241 P.2d 455, 459 (1952).
There is no California case construing "private parts" as used in section 314(1).
However, it appears that the California view would be consistent with the cited cases
since the Penal Code section which authorizes local regulation of exhibitions in public
places, refers to "exposure of the private parts or buttocks of any participant or the
breasts of any female participant." CAL. PEN. CODE 318.6 (West 1970).
4. S. Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex The Sexual Aberrations,
in THa BAsic WnrrNGs OF SmmUND FREUD, 569 n.1 (A. Brill ed. 1938).
5. See text accompanying notes 55-61 infra.
6. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *64.
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havior was a misdemeanor at common law, punishable by fine and im-
prisonment.7 There was no enumeration of specific acts which were
punishable. Instead, the English courts applied a common sense stan-
dard to determine what conduct should be treated as criminally lewd
behavior.8
Likewise, current statutes are not specific as to what acts consti-
tute indecent exposure, and modem judges still may apply a common
sense approach to determine conduct's lewdness. But modem penal
statutes uniformly do require the presence of a defined, criminal in-
tent.'0 This note will examine the requirements of California Penal
Code section 314(1), which prohibits indecent exposure. The note
will consider the clarified standards announced by the court in Smith
to be used in determining the presence or absence of the requisite crim-
inal intent, and will discuss the decision's effect on the roles of state
and local authorities in regulating public nudity.
In Re Smith
Defendant Smith and a male friend went to Black's Beach in San
Diego to sunbathe and found what appeared to be a secluded spot.
Smith took off all his clothing, lay down on his back on a towel and
fell asleep. When he awoke the beach was no longer deserted. In ad-
dition to a number of other persons who were present, the police had
arrived and promptly arrested Smith on a charge of violating Califor-
nia Penal Code section 314(1) which provides in relevant part that:
Every person who willfully and lewdly . . . [e]xposes his person,
or the private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any place
where there are present other persons to be offended or annoyed
thereby. . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.' 1
To determine whether Smith's conduct constituted indecent ex-
posure, the trial court applied its view of the prevailing community
sense of decency. After a ruling that a substantial number of persons
would have been repulsed by his conduct, Smith was convicted.' 2 The
conviction was affirmed on appeal, but on petition for writ of habeas
corpus the California Supreme Court vacated. The court concentrated
on Smith's lack of lewd intent at the time the offense allegedly had been
committed, rather than on the fact that persons actually may have
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., The King v. Crunden, 170 Eng. Rep. 1091 (K.B. 1809).
9. See Reporter's Transcript at 6, 7, People v. Smith, No. M-90180 (San Diego
Mun. Ct., Jan. 8, 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Reporter's Transcript]. See also
text accompanying note 12 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 27-34 infra.
11. CAL. PEN. CODE §314(1) (West 1970).
12. Reporter's Transcript, supra note 9, at 6, 7.
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been offended by Smith's conduct. The court reasoned that since the
beach was "isolated" when Smith disrobed, and since he never engaged
in any activity intentionally directing attention to his genitals, his
conduct was not lewd as contemplated by the statute.
The court mustered support for its conclusion by taking notice of
the consequences of a conviction of indecent exposure: compulsory reg-
istration as a sex offender under California Penal Code section 290. The
court reasoned that Smith's sunbath was not the sort of sexually de-
praved conduct that the registration statute was designed to obviate
and was therefore not proscribed by section 314(1).
Elements of Section 314(1)
A Public Place
In order to be classified criminally indecent an exposure must be
perpetrated in "any public place, or in any place where there are pres-
ent other persons to be offended or annoyed thereby . . . ."' A
public place has been construed to be a place where the public has a
right to go and to be. 4 Webster defines "public" as being open to
common or general use, participation, enjoyment and open to the free
and unrestricted use of the public under some degree of civic or state
control.' 5 A public beach has been construed to be "one left by the
state, or those claiming under it, open to the common use of the public,
and which the unorganized public and each of its members have a right
to use while it remains such."'16
Yet, as indicated, section 314(1) does not regulate conduct only
if carried out in a "public place." It also proscribes certain conduct
occurring in any place, public or private, where other persons are pres-
ent.
At common law the number of persons required to witness a de-
fendant's act in order to classify it as criminal public exposure was the
subject of divided judicial opinion.' 7  Some English judges felt that
13. CAL. PEN. CODE § 314(1) (West 1970).
14. People v. Belanger, 243 Cal. App. 2d 654, 657, 52 Cal. Rptr. 660, 662
(1966), citing 28 CJ.S. Drunkards, § 14 (1955). See also Messina v. State, 212
Mi. 602, 605, 130 A.2d 578, 579-80 (1957); Davison v. State, 281 P.2d 196, 198
(Okla. Crim. App. 1955).
15. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATrONAL DIcTioNARY 2005 (2d unabr. ed. 1959).
See also Gardner v. Vic Tanney Compton, Inc., 182 Cal. App. 2d 506, 510-11, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 490, 493-94 (1960), citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1460 (3d ed. 1933).
16. Brower v. Wakeman, 88 Conn. 8, 10-11, 89 A. 913, 914 (1914), cited in
Gardner v. Vic Tanney Compton, Inc., 182 Cal. App. 2d 506, 511, 6 Cal. Rptr.
490, 494 (1960).
17. Perhaps the earliest recorded judicial comment on "public place" as applied
to public indecency was in The King v. Sidley, 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B. 1660),
May 19731
even though an individual exposed himself in a place open to public
view, the conduct was not indictable if witnessed by only one person. 8
Other judges emphasized the nature and quality of the defendant's con-
duct, which permitted a finding of lewdness regardless of the number
of onlookers.' 9 The latter view consistently has been adopted in
this country, so that the number of "victims" is not a determinant of
guilt. 20
Some states do not even require that those who actually witness
the defendant's conduct be offended or annoyed by it.2 1  In State v.
Sousa," a Connecticut appellate court explained that "[tlhe offense
charged is not against the woman merely; it is against the state ....
These statutes deal with the defendant's state of mind, not the "vic-
tim's." Thus, in determining whether the act was perpetrated in a
public place with the requisite criminal intent, a particular witness's
sensitivity to sexual explicitness is not pertinent. Consequently, it has
been held that even the consent of an observer would not alter the
criminal character of the exposure.24
In Smith, although Black's Beach was empty when the defend-
ant arrived and disrobed, the defense stipulated that the beach was
public. Indeed, the defense stated the issue in the case as "whether or
where the defendant exposed himself from the balcony of his apartments overlooking
Covent Garden in London. There was no evidence introduced of how many persons
witnessed his conduct; however, it occurred in a spot so open to public view that the
court readily condemned the "grand scandal de Christianity."
18. See, e.g., The Queen v. Watson, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 376, 377 (Q.B. 1847)
where Lord Denman, C.J., held that "[tihe general rule is, that [the conduct] must be
public; that is, to the injury or offence of several." Evidence that only a single female
witnessed defendant's exposure, accordingly, did not fulfill the requirements of the
offense. Accord, The Queen v. Webb., 169 Eng. Rep. 271 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1848);
The Queen v. Orchard, 3 Cox. Crim. Cas. 248 (Q.B. 1848): "It is not enough to say
that the parties committed the act in a public and open place, but it must be laid
[sic] to have been within sight of Her Majesty's subjects ....... Id. at 250-51.
19. See, e.g., The King v. Crunden, 170 Eng. Rep. 1091 (K.B. 1809) (sunbathing
on the beach near newly constructed houses). See also Van Houten v. State, 46
N.J.L. 16 (Sup. Ct. 1884); State v. Roper, 18 N.C. 213 (1835).
20. See Messina v. State, 212 Md. 602, 605, 130 A.2d 578, 579-80 (1957);
Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1353, 1357 (1964).
21. In People v. Succop, 57 Cal. Rptr. 269, 274, vacated on other grounds, 67
Cal. 2d 785, 433 P.2d 473, 63 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1967), the court held that "[tlhere is
nothing in the language of [section 314(1)] requiring that a person in fact be of-
fended ...... In People v. Sanchez, 239 Cal. App. 2d 51, 48 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1965),
and People v. Williams, 183 Cal. App. 2d 689, 7 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1960), defendants
were convicted of indecent exposure, and in neither case was there any discussion in-
dicating that the witnesses had in fact been annoyed or offended.
22. 2 Conn. Cir. 452, 201 A.2d 664 (1964).
23. Id. at 456, 201 A.2d at 666.
24. E.g., State v. Martin, 125 Iowa 715, 719, 101 N.W. 637, 638 (1904); People
v. Bixby, 67 Barb. 221, 222 (N.Y.-Sup. Ct. 1875).
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not sunbathing in the nude on a public beach is lewd conduct . ".. ,,25
Even though it is clear that in Smith the public place element of the
offense was satisfied, the supreme court emphasized the isolated con-
dition of the public beach at the time Smith disrobed to negative any in-
ference that he acted with the requisite criminal intent.26
Mens Rea
Guilt or innocence of indecent exposure is not a matter of
measuring the amount of flesh exposed; one does not caliper the
revealed epidermis and certify guilt as increasing by the square
inch; the indecency of an exposure is always a matter of intent
to be gathered from all of the circumstances.2 7
Although it is uniformly settled that accidental exposure of the
private parts will not subject an individual to criminal liability,23 an
analysis of state statutes proscribing indecent exposure discloses two
distinct mens rea requirements.29 The first approach requires that
specific willful and lewd or obscene intent be present.30 In order to
sustain a conviction under such a statute the prosecution must allege
and prove that the defendant acted both willfully and lewdly; an
allegation and proof that the defendant was criminally negligent is
not sufficient.3" The second apprbach is less stringent and requires
only an act that was willfully done.32 These latter statutes do require
that the act be offensive to those who saw it or to the community's sense
of decency, but they do not require that the defendant act with a spe-
25. Reporter's Transcript, supra note 9, at 5 (emphasis added).
26. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
27. People v. Hildabridle, 353 Mich. 562, 592, 92 N.W.2d 6, 19 (1958).
28. See, e.g., People v. Kerry, 249 Cal. App. 2d 246, 251, 57 Cal. Rptr. 289,
291, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 916 (1967) (the court implied that if the defendant could
substantiate that his exposure was caused by his sweatpants accidently being torn
from his body, he would not be guilty of indecent exposure). See also State v. Sousa,
2 Conn. C.C.R. 452, 455, 201 A.2d 664, 666 (1964); Peyton v. District of Col., 100
A.2d 36, 37-38 (D.C. Mun. CL App. 1953); People v. Ulman, 258 App. Div. 262,
263-64, 16 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (1939); State v. Stewart, 38 Ohio L. Abs. 543, 547,
50 N.E.2d 910, 912 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943).
29. See generally Comment, Criminal Law and Procedure-Indecent Exposure-
Nudism, 33 MicH. L. REv. 936 (1935).
30. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 314(1) (West 1970); D.C. CoDE ANN. § 22-1112
(1967), construed in Hearn v. District of Col., 178 A.2d 434 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1962); Mnx. STAT. ANN. § 617.23 (1964); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 245.00 (McKinney
Supp. 1972-73); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1011 (1) (Supp. 1972-73).
31. See, e.g., Hearn v. District of Col., 178 A.2d 434, 437-39 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1962); People v. Hildabridle, 353 Mich. 562, 590-91, 92 N.W.2d 6, 18-19 (1958);
State v. Peery, 224 Minn. 346, 351-53, 28 N.W.2d 851, 854-55 (1947); People v.
Ulman, 258 App. Div. 262, 264, 16 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (1939); McKinley v. State,
33 Okla. Crim. 434, 244 P. 208 (1926).
32. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4519 (1963).
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cifically lewd or obscene intent.3 3  California adopts the former ap-
proach. Since the requirements of Penal Code section 314(1) are
worded in the conjunctive, it is clear that two special mental elements,
willfulness and lewdness, must accompany the guilty act in order for
it to constitute indecent exposure. 4
Willfulness
The court in Smith defined "willfully" as requiring "simply a
purpose or willingness to commit the act."35  There was no question
that Smith had willfully exposed himself since he intentionally removed
his clothes in order to sunbathe.
Lewdness
Lewd conduct is that product of immorality that has relation to
sexual impurity. 6 The court noted that the dictionary defines "lewd"
as "sexually unchaste or licentious; dissolute; lascivious; suggestive of
or tending to moral looseness; inciting to sensual desire or imagination;
indecent, obscene, salacious. '' 3
The court cited no cases construing the term "lewdly" as used in
Penal Code section 314(1), but relied on cases construing the term as
used in other statutes. Penal Code section 288, which makes it un-
lawful to "willfully" and "lewdly" commit any lewd or lascivious act
upon a child, was interpreted in People v. Loignon3s where the de-
fendant claimed that the mens rea requirement of section 288 was un-
constitutionally vague. In rejecting the defendant's challenge, the court
of appeal said:
Although higher standards of certainty will be required of penal
than of civil statutes, a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs
words of long usage or with common-law meaning, notwithstand-
33. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Falcone, 202 Pa. Super. 474, 477, 198 A.2d
421, 423 (1964).
34. In In re Correa, 36 Cal. App. 512, 175 P. 615 (1918), the defendant was
convicted for "willfully and unlawfully" exposing his person under California Penal
Code § 311, which required "willful and lewd" conduct. This section was repealed by
Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 2147, § 1, at 4427. Defendant's conviction was reversed because
the indictment failed to charge the defendant with lewd intent-an essential element
of the offense. Contra, State v. Martin, 125 Iowa 715, 716-17, 101 N.W. 637, 638
(1904).
35. 7 Cal. 3d at 364, 497 P.2d at 809, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 337 (1972), citing
CAL. PEN. CODE § 7(1) (West 1970).
36. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1052 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
37. 7 Cal. 3d at 365, 497 P.2d at 809, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 337, citing WEBSTEV'S
NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1301 (unabr. 3d ed. 1961).
38. 160 Cal. App. 2d 412, 325 P.2d 541 (1958).
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ing an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates
might differ.39
The court then construed "lewd" to mean dissolute, wanton, or de-
bauched.
In In re Giannini,40 two defendants were charged with violation
of section 314(1) and section 647(a)4 which prohibits lewd and dis-
solute conduct in a public place. As in Loignon, the defendants
claimed that the words "lewdly" and "lewd or dissolute" were un-
constitutionally vague. The court, however, construed the words as
identical to "obscene" and therefore rejected the vagueness objec-
tion.42
Lewdness Inferred
Both the defense and prosectuion in Smith agreed that at the time
Smith and his companion arrived at Black's Beach it was deserted,43
and that the persons on the beach when Smith was arrested had arrived
after Smith had fallen asleep.44 The trial court summarized the police
report as stating that a young couple had just walked by Smith; a group
of juvenile boys came out of the surf about fifty feet west of Smith;
three juvenile girls were lying on the beach approximately fifty feet
south of Smith and one of the girls was looking up in Smith's direc-
tion.-5
The court concluded that lewd conduct required sexual motivation;
that the defendant must intend to direct public attention to his genitals
to fulfill a sexual purpose.48 It was stipulated at trial that at no time
while Smith was on the beach did he have an erection or engage in any
activity directing attention to his genitals. Thus, the fact that he re-
moved his clothing solely for the purpose of sunbathing on an iso-
lated beach precluded the court from finding that he acted with lewd
intent.
The key to the supreme court's determination that Smith acted
innocently and without criminal intent is found in its use of the word
39. Id. at 420, 325 P.2d at 545, quoting Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.
2d 49, 60, 216 P.2d 859 (1950).
40. 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 910 (1969).
41. "Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly
conduct, a misdemeanor: (a) Who solicits anyone to engage in or who engages in
lewd or dissolute conduct in any public place or in place open to the public or exposed
to public view." CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(a) (West 1970).
42. 69 Cal. 2d at 571, 446 P.2d at 541, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 661, citing Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 506 (1966).
43. Reporter's Transcript, supra note 9, at 4, 5.
44. Id.
45. 7 Cal. 3d at 364 n.2, 497 P.2d at 808 n.2, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 336 n.2.
46. Id. at 366, 497 P.2d at 810, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
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"isolated" as a tool to infer the absence of lewd intent on Smith's part.
Indeed, the court rarely referred to Black's Beach without describing
it as isolated.4 7 Isolated is defined as "[p]laced or standing alone;
detached; separated; solitary."48  Although the evidence indicated
that Smith and his friend walked to a "secluded" spot on the beach and
that it was deserted when Smith took off his clothes, it also was apparent
that when he awoke the beach was populated with no fewer than eight
persons, at least two of whom walked directly past him.
In convicting Smith the trial court directed its attention to the fact
that even though Smith was asleep, other persons were present. The
court inferred that the requisite lewd intent had been shown, remark-
ing that: "I think [lewdness] can be [determined from] the affect
[sic] it has on other people. . . Some people are going to be re-
pulsed by [the defendant's conduct]. [To] [s]ome people maybe
it wouldn't make any difference . . . ."9 In vacating, the supreme
court considered the condition of the beach when Smith disrobed as
evidence of the absence of lewd intent. "Absent additional conduct
intentionally directing attention to his genitals for sexual purposes, a
person, as here, who simply sunbathes in the nude on an isolated beach
does not 'lewdly' expose his private parts within the meaning of sec-
tion 314."5o From the supreme court's reasoning it is clear that even
if the persons on Black's Beach were in fact offended or annoyed by
what they saw, Smith still would not have been guilty of indecent
exposure because he did not intend to offend or annoy them; and
presumably the court felt that he did not know, or have sufficient rea-
son to know, that they would be there.
The Michigan Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in Peo-
ple v. Hildabridle,51 where it reversed a conviction of criminal inde-
cent exposure for nudism practiced in a private nudist camp. The
court declared that an exposure is unlawful only if there is a deliberate
intention to indecently expose the person, and a reasonable chance that
exposure would be seen by a passer-by who would be shocked.5 2
To illustrate the type of exposure which would be considered inde-
cent, the court hypothesized a band of innocent-minded nudists march-
ing down the main street of Battle Creek, and explained: "The
claimed pureness of heart or sincere beliefs of the exposers here will
not save them because they will be deemed to know that the probable
47. Id. at 363-64, 366, 367, 497 P.2d at 808, 810-11, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 336,
338-39.
48. WEBSTE'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1317 (unabr. 2d ed. 1959).
49. Reporter's Transcript, supra note 9, at 7.
50. 7 Cal. 3d at 366, 497 P.2d at 810, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
51. 353 Mich. 562, 92 N.W.2d 6 (1958).
52. Id. at 590-91, 92 N.W.2d at 18-19.
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beholders . . . would not share their beliefs and would instead be
shocked. ... "I'
Arguably, Smith disregarded the chance that someone might ar-
rive on the beach and be repulsed, offended or annoyed by his ap-
pearance. But the California Supreme Court would not elevate to the
level of intentional lewdness Smith's failure to consider the remote
chance that persons might subsequently arrive at the isolated beach.
The absence of criminal intent is fatal to a charge of indecent ex-
posure, wherever it is perpetrated.54 Yet the Michigan court ex-
pressly recognized that the requisite criminal intent could be inferred
when the circumstances strongly suggest to the actor that his act of
public nudity will be observed. The California court's continued ref-
erence to the isolated condition of the beach involved in Smith indicates
a similar recognition. The crowded or deserted condition of a public
place is a variable which allows the courts to review allegedly inde-
cent conduct on a case by case basis. Nude sunbathing may be per-
missible on what a court considers an isolated beach, but the intent
to offend or annoy others may be inferred when the same conduct oc-
curs in a.public park or on an easily visible urban rooftop.
Prior Indecent Exposure Cases
The court's finding that Smith's conduct was not lewd seems to-
tally in line with prior California decisions dealing with indecent ex-
posure. The court held that "something more than mere nudity has
usually been shown."'55 Without exception the indecent exposure cases
reported in which convictions of males have been sustained have in-
volved public masturbation or exposure of the genitals in a sugges-
tive manner,56 often in the presence of the proverbial young female on
her way to school.57  These cases involving blatantly deviant con-
duct are easily distinguishable from Snith on two grounds. First,
53. Id. at 590, 92 N.W.2d at 18.
54. See, e.g., In re Correa, 36 Cal. App. 512, 172 P. 615 (1918), cited in In re
Smith, 7 Cal. 3d at 365, 497 P.2d at 809, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
55. 7 Cal. 3d at 365, 497 P.2d at 809, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
56. See, e.g., In re Bevll, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 442 P.2d 679, 69 Cal. Rptr. 599,
(1968); People v. Merriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 426 P.2d 161, 58 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1967);
People v. Kerry, 249 Cal. App. 2d 246, 57 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1967); People v. Sanchez,
239 Cal. App. 2d 51, 48 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1965); People v. Gardner, 195 Cal. App.
2d 829, 16 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1961); People v. Williams, 183 Cal. App. 2d 689, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 56 (1960).
57. See, e.g., People v. Succop, 67 Cal. 2d 785, 433 P.2d 473, 63 Cal. Rptr. 569
(1967); People v. Slutts, 259 Cal. App. 886, 66 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1968); People v.
Kelley, 161 Cal. App. 2d 215, 326 P.2d 177 (1958); People v. Evans, 138 Cal. App.
2d 849, 292 P.2d 570 (1956); People v. Brown, 186 Cal. App. 2d 889, 9 Cal. Rptr. 53
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960).
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there is no real question that acts such as public masturbation or de-
liberately suggestive gestures involving exposed genitals are done for
sexual purposes, so courts have had little difficulty finding the requi-
site lewd intent. Second, an examination of the cases indicates that
the sexually motivated conduct generally was perpetrated in noniso-
lated urban areas such as a public street, 58 a backporch overlooking
the street,5" a laundromat 60 or a parking lot." A comparison of
Smith's conduct with these cases in which conduct was adjudged lewd
certainly provided support for the court's unanimous decision to va-
cate his conviction and issue the writ of habeas corpus.
Nudity Per Se is Not Lewd
The court construed lewdness as requiring a motive to sexually
arouse, gratify or affront, and maintained that the necessary proof of
such motivation was not presented in Smith because nudity alone is
not lewd. 2 This conclusion seems sound in principle, but appears to
be without direct precedent in California. The court relied for author-
ity on cases which dealt with photographs of nude adults or with live
performances involving only partial nudity of females. The court ap-
parently could cite no case involving a nonpictorial exposure of male
genitals in which the defendant's conduct had not been adjudged
lewd. 63  Smith thus appears to be the first reported case in California in
which a court has determined whether live male nudity per se, other
than that involved in a theatrical performance, 64 could be considered
lewd.
The court cited Manual Enterprises v. Day65 in which the United
States Supreme Court referred to the test first set forth in Roth v. United
States,66 that published material is obscene only if it is patently offensive
58. See, e.g., People v. Slutts, 259 Cal. App. 2d 886, 66 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1968);
People v. Kelley, 161 Cal. App. 2d 215, 326 P.2d 177 (1958); People v. Evans, 138
Cal. App. 2d 849, 292 P.2d 570 (1956); People v. Brown, 186 Cal. App. 2d 889,
9 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1960).
59. People v. Sanchez, 239 Cal. App. 2d 51, 48 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1965).
60. People v. Merriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 426 P.2d 161, 58 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1967).
61. People v. Williams, 183 Cal. App. 2d 689, 7 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1960).
62. 7 Cal. 3d at 366, 497 P.2d at 810, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 338. The term "nudity
per se" apparently is used by the court to denote an exposure that not only lacks
sexual overtones but also lacks an audience. The reasoning employed suggests that
once a public place is no longer "isolated," nudity alone can lead to the inference of a
lewd intent. See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
63. See cases at notes 56-61 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 73-79 infra.
65. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
66. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Court held that obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected freedom of speech or press since the history of the First
Amendment shows implicitly that obscenity is to be rejected as utterly devoid of re-
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because it affronts contemporary standards relating to the description
or representation of sexual matters, if the dominant theme of the ma-
terial as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex, and if it is ut-
terly without redeeming social value.67 The court also cited Sunshine
Book Co. v. Summerfield,68 In re Panchot,6 9 and People v. Noroff70
as authority for its contention that nudity is not sexual activity. Each
of the last three cases, like Manual Enterprises, dealt with photographs
of adults in nude or seminude poses rather than with live nudity . In
Noroff the court remarked: "[The Supreme Court of the United
States] has held that the representation of the nude human form in a
nonsexual context is not obscene. . . . [N]o matter how ugly or
repulsive the presentation, we are not to hold nudity, absent a sexual
activity, to be obscene." 7'
The fact that the conduct in these four cases qualify for First
Amendment protection appears to weaken further the court's reliance
on them in sustaining Smith's conduct as noncriminal. Each of the above
four cases dealt with published material which is protected by the First
Amendment unless found obscene under the tests first promulgated
in Roth. Yet there is no issue of First Amendment protection raised
in Smith because:
Nudity per se is not protected by the First Amendment. It can-
not be seriously doubted that the State has a legitimate interest in
regulating nudity in certain contexts. . . . [O]n a crowded public
street, nudity, albeit, exercised without a scintilla of lewd intent,
is a matter of some governmental concern. It may constitute a
threat to the maintenance of public peace or, at the very least, a
hazard to traffic. Only when nudity becomes part of a method of
expression, such as a dance or play, does it come under the pro-
tective mantle of the First Amendment. 72
The court did rely on two cases which dealt with live-albeit par-
tial-nudity. In Boreta Enterprises, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Con-
deeming social importance. Id. at 484-85. However, sex and obscenity are not to be
regarded as synonymous. Id. at 487.
67. Id. at 489; accord, A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman
of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
68. 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (per curiam).
69. 70 Cal. 2d 105, 448 P.2d 385, 73 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1968).
70. 67 Cal. 2d 791, 433 P.2d 479, 63 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1967).
71. Id. at 797, 433 P.2d at 483, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (emphasis added).
72. Crownover v. Musick, 95 Cal. Rptr. 691, 694-95 (1971), hearing granted,
Aug. 13, 1971. See also Justice Douglas's dissent in Roth: "I assume there is nothing
in the Constitution which forbids Congress from using its power over the mails to
proscribe conduct on the grounds of good morals. No one would suggest that the
First Amendment permits nudity in public places . . . ." 354 U.S. at 512. One can
conjecture as to whether Justice Douglas would allow the isolation of an admittedly
"public place" to determine whether First Amendment protection might be applicable.
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trol Bd.,r3 the California Supreme Court held that the exposure of the fe-
male bosom in a licensed bar and restaurant was not contrary to pub-
lic morals. In Robins v. County of Los Angeles,7 4 the court of appeal
confronted the issue of whether a topless cocktail waitress was guilty
of indecent exposure and held that, whether or not defined as enter-
tainment, topless table service did not constitute a form of criminal
sexual activity subject to regulation by the state.75
In another case involving live exposure, In re Giannini,76 the su-
preme court decided that First Amendment protection extended to
topless dancers. The court held that a dance performed for entertain-
ment was constitutionally protected unless the dance, tested in the con-
text of contemporary community standards, appealed to the prurient
interest of the audience and affronted standards of decency generally
accepted in the community.7 7  In a case decided after Smith, People
73. 2 Cal. 3d 85, 465 P.2d 1, 84 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1970). The Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control conceded that the use of topless waitresses was not ob-
scene, illegal, or in violation of any rule or regulation duly issued by it. Nonetheless,
it sought, unsuccessfully, to revoke defendant's license by contending that the use of
topless waitresses was per se contrary to public welfare and morals. id. at 99, 465
P.2d at 10, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 122. The United States Supreme Court in California v.
LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390 (1972) held that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the states
broad powers to control the dispensing of alcohol under which the California De-
partment of Alcoholic Beverage Control could promulgate regulations imposing stand-
ards as to the type of entertainment which could be presented in bars and clubs
which it licensed. The Department had prohibited various forms of explicit sexual
acts or simulated acts as well as films depicting such acts. The majority of the Court
accepted California's contention that the adopted regulations dealt with conduct rather
than with protected speech and as such were not subject to the strict limitations of
the First Amendment. The majority scoffed at the suggested constitutional equivalence
of the "Bacchanalian revelries" prohibited by the Department and a performance by
a "scantily clad ballet troupe in a theater." Id. at 397.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, viewed the regulations as overbroad and imprecise.
Id. at 401-04. He argued that by requiring the owner of a nightclub to forego the
exercise of certain rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, the state had imposed
an unconstitutional condition on the granting of a license. Id. at 406-07. He rejected
California's argument that the rules were necessary to prevent sex crimes and a wide
variety of other evils by noting that the link between sex-related entertainment and
criminal activity has now largely been discredited. Id. at 404.
74. 248 Cal. App. 2d 1, 56 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1966).
75. Id. at 10-11, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 859. The court examined the Penal Code
sections under which prosecution of a topless cocktail waitress could be brought and
remarked: "Sections 314 and 647 require a willful intent to encourage or commit acts
of lewd or obscene public exposure and we must assume them prima facie inapplicable
to bare breasted waitresses, while section 415 is inapplicable unless we can assume
that passive and innocent exposure may incite the customers to such conduct, which
has not been demonstrated." Id. at 10, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
76. 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968).
77. Id. at 567, 446 P.2d at 538, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
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ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals," a California appellate court held that
First Amendment protection extended beyond topless dancing to in-
clude nude dancing. The court denied an injunction prohibiting nude
performances as an invalid restraint on free expression, unless the nude
dancing graphically depicted sexual activity, 79 in which case it would
be deemed lewd and therefore without constitutional protection. The
reasoning is analogous to that in Smith, since when one engaged in
nude conduct directs public attention to his genitals for sexual pur-
poses, it becomes lewd conduct.
Sarong Gals is distinguishable from Smith on the ground that in
the former case the public paid to see the defendant's "expression or
communication of ideas," while in Smith no such constitutional argu-
ment was made. Still, Sarong Gals is consistent with the holding in
Smith that nudeness is not per se lewd. Certainly, the case provides
more support than Boreta or Robins, both of which dealt only with
exposure of the female breast which, as indicated,80 is not included in
the definition of "private parts" as contemplated by the indecent
exposure statute.
Although the Smith result that mere nudity is not lewd is
sound in principle, the court reached its result with more limited prece-
dential authority than the opinion perhaps indicates.
Standards Adopted for Determining Lewdness
Responding to the need for a workable standard that would de-
fine clearly what conduct constitutes indecent exposure, the supreme
court was forced to reason by analogy and to apply for authority to
cases with facts markedly different from those in Smith. The court
noted that cases involving public masturbation and other deliberately
suggestive acts were definitely lewd and violated section 314(1), 1
that the representation of the nude human form, absent a graphic depic-
tion of sexual activity, was not lewd,82 and that partial female nudity in
a bar or other place of entertainment was not lewd.83
Two considerations that will aid in determining whether a partic-
ular exposure is criminally indecent were precipitated by the court's
reasoning. First, as indicated, to be lewd the exposure must direct
public attention to the genitals for purposes of sexual arousal, gratifi-
cation or affront.8 The second consideration is to determine whether
78. 27 Cal. App. 3d 46, 103 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1972).
79. Id. at 52, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
80. See note 3 supra.
81. 7 Cal. 3d at 365, 497 P.2d at 810, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
82. Id. at 366, 497 P.2d at 810, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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the consequence of a conviction of indecent exposure-registration as
a sex offender-was intended by the legislature to apply to a particular
defendant's acts. The Smith court buttressed its conclusion to va-
cate the defendant's conviction by pointing out that the California Pe-
nal Code automatically requires a person convicted of violating section
314(1) to register as a sex offender with the sheriff or chief of police
of any municipality where he resides.8 5 The court observed that the
legislature had enacted the registration provision based on a deter-
mination that persons found guilty of certain sexual crimes were likely
to be recidivists and therefore should be subject to police surveillance.
Since nude sunbathers do not seem to require constant police surveil-
lance to prevent them from committing such "crimes against society" in
the future, the court determined that the legislature could not reason-
ably have intended that the indecent exposure provision apply to
Smith's conduct. Thus, the harsh consequences of the sex offender
registration provision influenced the court's interpretation of what sort
of conduct was indecent exposure, and a fortiori, what sort of con-
duct justified imposing a lifelong regimen of registration and the stigma
of being classified a "sex offender."
To lend support to its argument that Smith's conduct was not of a
85. Id. The court analyzed Cal. Pen. Code § 290 (West Supp. 1972) which
states in pertinent part "Any person who, since the first day of July, 1944, has been
or is hereafter convicted in the State of California of the offense of assault with intent
to commit rape or the infamous crime against nature, under Section 220, or of any
offense defined in Sections 266 [seduction for prostitution], 267 [abduction for prostitu-
tion], 268 [seduction under promise of marriage], 285 [incest], 286 [crime against nature],
288 [lewd and lascivious acts against children], 288(a) [sex perversions], subdivision 1
of Section 647(a) [annoying or molesting children], subdivision 2 or 3 of Section 261
[forcible rape], subdivision (a) or (d) of Section 647 [soliciting or engaging in lewd
conduct in a public place; loitering in or about a public toilet for purposes of soliciting
or engaging in a lewd act] or subdivision 1 or 2 of Section 314, or of any offense in-
volving lewd and lascivious conduct under Section 272 [contributing to the delinquency
of a minor] . . . shall within 30 days . . . of his coming into any county or city,
or city and county in which he resides or is temporarily domiciled for such length of
time register with the chief of police of the city in which he resides or the sheriff of
the county if he resides in an unincorporated area.
Such registration shall consist of (a) a statement in writing signed by such person,
giving such information as may be required . . . and (b) the fingerprints and photo-
graphs of such person." In Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 349 P.2d
974, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, (1960) the supreme court summarized the trends in the literature
discussing criminal registration acts. The court noted writers' interests in the effect
which registration statutes have upon the modern trend of penology to stress the
rehabilitation rather than the punishment of criminals. Other writers discuss the
effectiveness of such statutes in protecting society against the recidivistic criminal.
The court pointed out that most of the writers attacked the policy and constitutionality
of criminal registration statutes, and the court provided a bibliography of current
commentaries. Id. at 679 n.5, 349 P.2d at 978 n.5, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 162 n.5.
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nature that would require registration as a sex offender, the court re-
lied on its approach in Barrows v. Municipal Court,8 6 where it held
that the vagrancy statute87 prohibiting "lewd or dissolute" conduct in a
public place was inapplicable to live theatrical performances. In
Barrows the defendants acted in a play entitled The Beard and engaged
in a simulated act of oral copulation during the performance. The
court reasoned that "[ilt would be irrational to impose upon an actor
in a theatrical performance . . . a lifetime requirement of registration
as a sexual offender because he may have performed . . . an act, per-
haps an obscene gesture, in a play."
8 8
Clearly, the sex offender registration requirement is intended to
apply only to persons convicted of seriously deviant conduct; a review
of the violations that trigger the statute's application establishes this.
The fact that indecent exposure is listed with such offenses as rape, se-
duction, incest, crimes against nature and child molestation, indicates
that in order to constitute indecent exposure the conduct must be con-
siderably more profligate than the conduct involved in Smith.
Consequences of the Decision
The import of the supreme court's reasoning in Smith appears
not only to be that a nonlewd nude sunbath is not punishable as
indecent exposure, but also that such conduct is not punishable under
any other section of the California Penal Code. Thus, the Smith
decision may be interpreted to permit only local regulation of such
conduct.
State Regulation of Nonlewd Exposures
The court of appeal in Robins v. County of Los Angeles deter-
mined that the Penal Code provisions potentially applicable to the public
display of the naked human body were sections 314, 415 and 647.89
86. 1 Cal. 3d 821, 464 P.2d 483, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1970).
87. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(a) (West 1970), quoted in note 49 supra. The
statute was originally designed to prohibit vagrancy and defined "vagrant" as a "lewd
or dissolute person." Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 169, § 2, at 638 (repealed 1961). In
1961 it was amended to deal directly with socially harmful, lewd conduct when such
conduct occurs in the public view. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 560, § 2, at 1672. It is
phrased in general terms and applies to any lewd conduct, not necessarily exposure.
88. 1 Cal. 3d at 826-27, 464 P.2d at 486, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
89. 248 Cal. App. 2d 1, 10, 56 Cal. Rptr. 853, 859-60 (1967).
But -see California Penal Code § 370 (West 1970), which defines public nuisance
stating in pertinent part: "Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent, or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neigh-
borhood, or by any considerable number of persons ...is a public nuisance." See
also CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 3479 (nuisance defined), 3480 (public nuisance) (West 1970).
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Section 647(a)9 ° prohibits disorderly conduct and, like section 314(1),
requires a lewd or dissolute intent. Section 41591 prohibits disturb-
ing the peace and requires a willful and malicious intent. The Penal
Code defines "malicious" as importing a desire to vex, annoy or in-
jure,92 while the Smith court defined as "lewd" that which is done for
purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or affront. Thus, it appears
that an exposure could not be malicious without also being lewd. If
an exposure is intended to vex, injure or annoy, it seemingly follows
that it is perpetrated with the intent to attract the attention of others
for purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or affront.
Further, "malice," as used in section 415, has been construed to
denote conduct which provokes others to acts of violence or to dis-
turb the peace and quiet. The cases indicate that a wish to confront
or incite others is required.93 If a court finds that a sunbather lying
on a beach has chosen his spot and disrobed deliberately with an in-
tent to confront, provoke or incite others, so that he could be con-
victed of disturbing the peace, the conclusion seems inescapable that,
by the Smith standards, the sunbather has "lewdly" exposed himself
in a manner which would sustain a conviction of indecent exposure.
On the other hand, if the spot chosen to sunbathe is isolated, as
in Smith, so that the lewd intent necessary for indecent exposure is ab-
sent, it seems unlikely that a court could still find malice in such con-
A literal reading of the statute indicates that an entire neighborhood, or at least
a considerable number of persons, must be affected for conduct to be punishable as a
public nuisance. Public nudity which interferes with the "comfortable enjoyment of
life or property" of a "considerable" number of persons, appears not only to be a
public nuisance but also to fit the standards for lewdness adopted in Smith. See text
accompanying notes 51-54 supra. Indeed, in Weis v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 730,
159 P. 464 (1916), the court of appeal ruled that an exposure which would have
constituted a public nuisance under Penal Code section 370 also violated then Penal
Code section 311; Repealed by Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 2147, § 1, at 4427 (now CAL.
PEN. CODE § 314(1) (West 1970)).
Dean Prosser suggested that statutes covering public nuisances have uniformly
been construed beyond their literal wording to include anything that was a nuisance at
common law. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 999
(1966). See People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941). Nevertheless, the
early English cases dealing with public nudity required that the act had to injure or
offend several persons to be indictable. See cases at note 18 supra. Thus, even at
common law in order for public nudity to constitute a public nuisance, it had to occur
in "nonisolated" surroundings. It appears, therefore, that conduct such as that of the
defendant in Smith does not satisfy the statutory definition of public nuisance.
90. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(a) (West 1970).
91. Id. § 415.
92. Id. § 7(4).
93. See, e.g., People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 99, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506
(1969), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); People v. Green, 234 Cal. App.
2d Supp. 871, 873, 44 Cal. Rptr. 438, 439 (1965); People v. Anderson, 117 Cal. App.
763, 767-68, 1 P.2d 64, 66 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1931).
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duct, since it was designed specifically to avoid others rather than to
confront or provoke them. The overlap of the two terms "malicious"
and "lewd," as applied to nude sunbathing, appears complete. One form
of mens rea could not be shown without the other also being shown.
Conversely, if one intent was not provable, the other also should not
be provable.
The Smith court's ruling that the petitioner's act of nude sun-
bathing was not proscribed by section 314(1) implies that it also
was not proscribed by sections 647(a) or 415, and that such nonlewd
nude sunbathing is not a crime punishable by the state.
Local Regulation of Nonlewd Exposures
Local legislation is invalid if it imposes additional requirements in
a field that is pre-empted by state law or if it conflicts with state
law.94 The supreme court in In re Lane concluded that the state had
adopted a general scheme for the regulation of the criminal aspects of
sexual activity, and that the state therefore occupied the entire field to
the exclusion of all local regulation. 95 In Smith, however, the su-
preme court explicitly ruled that "nudity does not constitute a form of
sexual activity."90 Therefore, an ordinance adopted for the purpose
of regulating nudity on some basis other than that it is a sexual activity
should not be subject to invalidation on the ground of state preemp-
tion.
A unanimous supreme court in Lancaster v. Municipal Court97
looked beyond a local authority's own characterization of the purpose
of its ordinance to the ordinance's real effect in determining whether
94. The California Supreme Court has said: "[L]egislation by a local body
(other than in furtherance of the state law) [is prevented] when the entire field,
that is the subject matter of the ordinance, has already been fully occupied by
the state, [because the local body] has attempted to legislate in a field, and in a
manner, beyond its constitutional power." Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.
2d 674, 681-82, 349 P.2d 974, 979, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (1960). The respondents in
Abbott contended that passage of a local criminal registration ordinance was a rea-
sonable exercise of the city's police power. However, such an exercise must be con-
sistent with the California Constitution, which provides that a city "may make and
enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not
in conflict with general laws." CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 11. Therefore, the court
stated, local police power is limited, by its terms, to a subject matter that is not in
conflict with general laws. The court noted that the word "conflict" as used in section
11 of Article XI applied not only to a mere conflict in language, but applied equally to
a conflict of the jurisdiction of state and legal bodies. Id. Local Legislation is intended
to be supplemental to state legislation. Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 370-371, 125
P.2d 482, 485 (1942).
95. 58 Cal. 2d 99, 102, 372 P.2d 897, 898, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 858 (1962).
96. 7 Cal. 3d at 366, 497 P.2d at 810, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
97. 6 Cal. 3d 805, 494 P.2d 681, 100 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1972).
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it was pre-empted. In Lancaster, the Beverly Hills Judicial District
contended that a Los Angeles County ordinance prohibiting commercial
transsexual massages was a permissible regulation of the business of
administering massages and not an attempt to regulate sexual activity
-a field pre-empted by the State. However, the court pointed to the
local district attorney's admission during trial that the purpose of the
statute was " 'to regulate a source of licentiousness . . . this ordi-
nance regulates nude exposure.' "98 The court also considered letters
to the board of supervisors from the county chief administrative of-
ficer and from the sheriffs department indicating that the purpose of
the ordinance was to aid police in investigating and controlling the
prostitution problem. The court concluded that there was no "rea-
sonable purpose to the ordinance . . . other than to limit sexual ac-
tivity,"99 and that it therefore was invalid.
As a result of Smith, nonlewd public nudity appears to be a mat-
ter governable solely by local ordinance, if at all. For example, a Main
County, California, ordinance' currently makes it a misdemeanor
to willfully appear in public with one's private parts or the female
breast exposed. If the "reasonable purpose" behind this regulation
is construed to be the maintenance of local order, it would not be
pre-empted by state law. However, if a court, as in Lancaster, finds
sufficient evidence of local legislative intent to regulate such activity
on the sole ground that it is sexual activity, then the resulting in-
validity of the ordinance would remove the only criminal sanc-
tion applicable to nonlewd nude conduct in Marin County. As made
clear in Smith, the state law does not prohibit such conduct, 1 ' and
a local ordinance, if pre-empted, would be a nullity.
The Smith decision thus leaves to local authorities the decision
whether to regulate nonlewd nudity. If a city or county chooses to
prohibit such activity, it may do so by drafting a statute which does
98. Id. at 809, 494 P.2d at 683, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
99. Id.
100. "Every person who shall willfully appear on or in any public park, square,
preserve, avenue, street, lane alley or other public land in the unincorporated area of
Marin County in a state of dress or undress in which the private parts of such person
or the female breast are exposed shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." Marin
County, Cal. Ordinance 6176.010; Nudity Prohibited on Public Property. Unlike the
Marin County ordinance, the San Francisco Police Code requires, like the California
Penal Code, a lewd intent in order for the conduct to be punishable. "It shall be
unlawful for any person to engage in or be a party to or to solicit or invite any other
person to engage in or be a party to any lewd, indecent or obscene act or conduct."
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE § 215 (1970) (lewd and indecent acts prohibited).
Since no other section in the Police Code prohibits conduct such as nonlewd nude
sunbathing, such conduct, if perpetrated as in Smith, would seem to be without
criminal sanction in San Francisco.
101. See text accompanying notes 89-93 supra.
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not impinge on the state's exclusive right to regulate criminal sexual ac-
tivity. In a locality that chooses not to enact such legislation, conduct
such as Smith's will be as noncriminal as a stroll in the park-fully
clothed.
Conclusion
The unanimous decision of the supreme court vacating Smith's
conviction was undoubtedly sound. Penal Code section 314(1) re-
quires that an exposure be both willful and lewd to be criminal. By
holding that a person is not guilty of lewd conduct when he simply
sunbathes in the nude on an isolated beach, the court in Smith pre-
vented the manifest injustice that would have resulted from the need-
less stigmatizing of a life with the taint of conviction of a sexual of-
fense.
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